

## **The Self-Evident Non-Spatiality of Consciousness**

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The purpose of this work is to describe that 'it is self-evident that consciousness is non-spatial'; that is, 'consciousness can be represented by no spatial structure'. It considers the example of the consciousness of bodily pain, which is stated to be conceptually distinct from its bodily counterpart, i.e. identification of some electrochemical signal in brain, as a self-evident fact. This example is just a matter of illustration and is not meant to be the justification/basis of the self-evident non-spatiality of consciousness, as no self-evident truth needs justification. Further it is argued that a reader's possible denial of the self-evident non-spatiality of consciousness is, in fact, their inability to understand the truth due to the relatively profound concepts involved in it; as a simple self-evident mathematical proposition, like if  $p$  implies  $q$  and if  $p$  is true then  $q$  is true, may not be self-evidently comprehensible to a person of extremely poor intellect. The self-evident proposition that 'consciousness is non-spatial' is one of the six self-evident propositions that form the axiomatic/self-evident foundation of the NSTP (Non – Spatial Thinking Process) theory.

### **Axiom: Consciousness is non-spatial.**

In other words, no kind of consciousness, e.g. consciousness of bodily pain, can be represented by any spatial structure.

The consciousness of bodily pain, for example, is conceptually distinct from its bodily counterpart (i.e. identification of some electrochemical signal in brain). [*This example is just a matter of illustration and is not meant to be the justification/basis of the self-evident non-spatiality of consciousness, as no self-evident truth needs justification.*]

- a. This conceptual distinction is self - evident / axiomatic.
- b. The knowledge of the process of identification of electrochemical signal is neither necessary nor sufficient to have the knowledge of the consciousness of bodily pain, for example.<sup>1</sup>

*The axiom stated above is meant to be a 'self-evident truth'. That is, it is not mere postulate. Now, it may be that it is not self-evident according to the reader. However, it is self-evident according to the author. A simple mathematical axiom, like if  $p$  implies  $q$  and if  $p$  is true then  $q$  is true, may not be self-evident according to a person of extremely poor intellect. In the same way, the axiom that 'consciousness is non-spatial', involving relatively much profound, hard-to-understand concepts, may potentially be 'non-self-evident' (i.e. self-evidently incomprehensible) according to a human of average intellect.*

The self-evident proposition that ‘consciousness is non-spatial’ is one of the six self-evident propositions that form the axiomatic/self-evident foundation of **the NSTP (Non – Spatial Thinking Process) theory**, which is stated below.

The NSTP theory is a (philosophy of mind) semi-idealistic as well as semi-dualistic theory that the material universe, where some peculiar phenomena like quantum non-locality exist in, is exclusively a group of superhuman as well as non-superhuman thinking processes existing in the form of (non-spatial physical/material) feelings (i.e. states of consciousness). In computer terminology, it regards the (material) universe as a non-spatial computer, with hardware of (non-spatial) feelings and software of superhuman as well as non-superhuman thoughts/ideas, including those of space, which is then an illusive/virtual/merely apparent entity. The mere existence of the superhuman thoughts is responsible for the empirical (i.e. a posteriori) order in the non-superhuman ones. The theory, however, accepts the possibility of the reality of space, the space where the phenomena like quantum non-locality do not exist in. The theory is constituted of 6 axioms, 1 theorem, and 3 conjectures. The key strength and novelty in the theory lies in its axiomatic/self-evident foundation, its innovative semi-idealism and semi-dualism, its idea of superhuman states of consciousness, its computational description of idealism, and, in general, its road to idealism and dualism.

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<sup>1</sup> For more information see Jackson, Frank. 1982. "Epiphenomenal Qualia", *Philosophical Quarterly* 32, pp. 127-136.